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I 
Why did the Holy Roman Empire survive for so long? Why did it finally 
collapse in the era of Napoleon I in 1806? Why did it not break down in 1548, 
1648 or 1748? In the last fifteen years West German historians have produced 
an historiographical revolution. Major reinterpretations now cover the whole of the 
early modern period, 1521-1806. No longer can we be satisfied with charting the 
rise of Austria and Prussia as an explanation even of the salient features, let alone 
of the whole, of early modem German history. The traditional view that the re-
ligious and civil wars destroyed the federal system of the Old Reich during the 
Thirty Years' War flies in the face of the detailed evidence from the sources on 
which the new interpretations are based. The fundamental difference between the 
older and the newer views is one of emphasis in the interpretation of the existing 
facts, and about the facts themselves there is very little disagreement. The tradi-
tional approach of historians before 1945 was to concentrate on the relatively 
short periods of civil and foreign war under Charles V, Rudolf II, Ferdinand II, 
Leopold I and Maria Theresia for their interpretation of the whole early modem 
period. The new approach, especially since about 1965, has been to concentrate 
on the long years between these military and social upheavals, showing to what 
extent territorial rulers of large and small states played their parts as responsi-
ble politicians working within the structure of the Holy Roman Empire to succeed 
in the long term in keeping respectively the Turks and the French out of Habs-
burg Austria in the southeast, and out of Rhineland Germany in the west, du-
ring the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was achieved 
despite the great difficulties on internal dissent in matters of religion which gave 
rise to unwelcome heterodoxies with which early modem European states were 
thought generally at the time to be politically unable to cope without splitting 
asunder. Despite these major set-backs the Holy Roman Empire survived as a loose 
confederal agglomeration of many hundred small states representing all the forms of 
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government that the western tradition has ever known - from urban and rural 
republics as diverse as Nuremberg and Dithmarschen, through to theocracies as 
diverse as Calvinist and Lutheran "nunneries" like Herford and Quedlinburg and 
on to archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbeys, priories, lordships, counties, dukedoms, 
electorates and kingdoms; ecclesiastical and lay, elected and inherited, oligarchic 
and autocratic. Seventeenth-century Germany was both a microcosm of interna-
tional law and diplomacy looking towards the future in global politics, as well 
as the happy hunting-ground of constitutional lawyers puzzled by the endless 
complexity and diversity of territorial states sporting systems of public law that 
not even Aristotle could have dreamed of in the worst cauchemar. 
The new interpretations of the multifariously vigorous early modem Holy Ro-
man Empire are based upon two interlocking institutions only now being examined 
thoroughly for the first time in terms of what they were to the people operating 
them at the time. The first is the Old Reich federal system of fiscalism and taxa-
tion for overall military defence purposes. The second is the way in which that 
system was operated especially in West Germany through regional politics in the 
Imperial . Circles or Reichskreise, above all those of Franconia, Swabia, the Elec-
toral Rhineland, Lower-Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony and the Upper Rhine-
land. 
The work of Winfried Schulze is an important new contribution to the first 
problem: that of Alfred Schrocker highlights the second. The great advantage in 
reading these two works together is that no longer does the Thirty Years' War 
remain a great divide between two fundamentally different ways of running 
German society and politics. Instead, the period 1618-48 merely finds its place 
as a hiatus in the politics of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole which was made 
good with the restoration of Reich federal, national and regional legislatures, 
courts, tax and military systems once again linking the 1650s with the 1610s. 
Schulze and Schrocker provide answers to the question why the Holy Roman 
Empire lasted for so long, whereas the books by Notker Hammerstein and 
Richard van Diilmen try to answer the question why the Holy Roman Empire 
effectively collapsed at the end of the eighteenth century ; not sooner and not 
later. Whereas Schulze and Schrocker provide much more adequate answers to 
their question from the administrative and diplomatic archives, Hammerstein 
and van Diilmen delve into the history of education and of political ideas which 
is ultimately far less satisfactory in providing an answer to their overriding 
question. Indeed, despite the careful reconstruction of political events which 
forms a classic in the new historiography - K. 0. Aretin's Heiliges Romisches 
Reich 1776-1806 (Wiesbaden, 1967) -the best explanation of how the traditional 
politics of the eighteenth-century Holy Roman Empire was sapped of its strength 
lies in Klaus Epstein's The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, 1966). 
Epstein still provides the only satisfactory linking of the history of ideas with the 
political and administrative history that we have in any language when we wish 
to know why the Holy Roman Empire disappeared around the year 1800. Schulze 
and Schrocker explain the successful continuity of the Old Reich. Hammerstein 
and van Diilmen do not explain the discontinuity and failure of the Old Reich 
but only lead the reader towards that crucial question in the light of his prior 
reading of works like those of Schulze and Schrocker which for the first time in 
the German academic historiographical tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries seem to make sense of early modem German society and politics. 
II 
Winfried Schulze's Reich und Tiirkengefahr is an important new interpreta-
tion of the constitutional development of the German Old Reich and its component 
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territories in the later sixteenth century. It documents convincingly the process 
whereby the Habsburg emperors had very little freedom of manoeuvre in making 
any significant concessions to the Protestants after 1555. In their turn the Pro-
testants were unable to withhold Turk taxes until well into the first decade of the 
seventeenth century. So there was unity in the Old Reich despite three antago-
nistic "parties" in the German federal organs of government- satisfied Lutherans 
led by Saxony; aggressively legitimate Catholics led by the Austrian Habsburgs 
and their rivals, the Bavarian Wittelsbachs; and violently illegal Calvinists led 
by the Palatinate. Schulze concludes that, despite all the harsh controversy sur-
rounding religious conflict and the disposal of ecclesiastical property, resulting in 
the breakdown of law and order at overall Reich level, there is little doubt that 
the Turk threat was the truly significant element holding the political order to-
gether with a considerable degree of success (p. 366). This occurred especially 
in the 1590s despite the failure of the Protestants to accept majority decisions as 
binding in matters of federal taxation and defence. In other words, the Turk wars 
and the consolidation of the military frontier under Maximilian II and Rudolf II kept 
the German Old Reich alive. Peace in 1606 spelled the end of internal German 
federal harmony. 
The Turk wars of the later sixteenth century produced a new form of 
military taxation granted via the regional imperial federal Circles (Reichskreise), 
and not through the Reichstag, the circumvention of which A. H. Loebl had 
already .begun to explore in articles published before he was killed in the First 
World War. Schulze now clinches the argument from the source materials. 
Firstly, Rudolf II's Circle politics centred on Franconia in the 1590s, a policy 
disliked by territorial rulers, whose imperial assembly rights were thereby being 
by-passed. Secondly, Reich tax grants continued to develop institutions of assembly 
and taxation at territorial state level, but increasingly only in the prerogative, 
paternalist and absolutist interests of territorial rulers and not of territorial sub-
jects, however prominent the latter may have been as nobles or town councillors. 
Thirdly, territorial rulers used the federal institutions of the Old Reich to overcome 
the opposition to their paternalist style of government evinced by their own 
territorial estates, Landtage or parliamentary assemblies, and finance committees, 
thereby asserting executive power over all the powerful feudal corporations and 
families within their sphere of high jurisdiction, reducing one and all to the status 
of privileged subjects. "Frondeur feudalism" was never given a chance because 
of the way territorial rulers clung to, and effectively used, the Old Reich federal 
system of politics, which was essential to their new, state-building fiscalism. In 
other words without the Turk wars, fought by regional Circle-based Old Reich 
federalism, there could not have been the absolutist territorial state development 
that has been so meticulously and well traced by F. L. Carsten in his seminal 
work, Princes and Parliaments in Germany (London, 1959). Fourthly , territorial 
rulers operating at Old Reich level initiated the extraordinary tax-grant system for 
territorial-state subjects, who were inevitably at times seriously over-taxed in 
such a way that they could neither appeal for reform nor develop a code of 
moral outrage and justice which would allow them to reform or rebel. The days 
were over when the Bible could be used to legitimate rebellion on the basis of 
divine law as happened in the 1520s and '30s. Sixty years later the Old Reich 
had begun to prove its effectiveness as a federal oligarchy of territorial rulers, 
despite the religious split, as Reichsunmittelbare, exercising their prerogative 
powers each separately as sovereigns over all their own reichsmittelbare, 
territorial subjects. 
When these reichsunmittelbare territorial-state rulers fell out with each 
other over matters of dynastic rivalry and religious disagreement, as happened 
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in the run up to the Thirty Years' War, the conflict could only be resolved on 
the basis of a return to the Old Reich federal institutions: those very checks and 
balances operated by laboriously mutual cooperation, which the ·fathers and 
grandfathers of the politicians who accepted the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had 
in their tum negotiated. The result was a great success: the first internationally 
and legally recognized balance of power in Europe, well documented in the metic-
ulously edited volumes of diplomatic correspondence and peace negotiations, 
the Acta Pacis Westpholicae (Munster, 1962ff). Without the experience of the 
tortuous compromises of Old Reich federal German internal politics since the 
1550s in matters of internal and external security and defence, the foundations 
could not have been laid for the subsequent international concert that emerged 
in mid-seventeenth-century central Europe. The Austrian Habsburg contribution 
to this development at the territorial-state level has been carefully established in 
Winfried Schulze's previous monograph, Landesdefension und Staatsbildung. 
Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerosterreichischen Territorialstaates 1564-1619 
(Vienna, 1973). The Thirty Years' War in Germany is the key to understanding 
the seventeenth-century crisis, but that understanding can only come through 
the thorough investigation of Old Reich federal politics, especially in the later 
sixteenth century, in conjunction with the way in which it was exploited from 
within the Habsburg dynastic system above all at Prague and Vienna, rather 
than in Brussels or Madrid. 
Schulze leads the return to the constitutional history of early modem Old 
Reich federal Germany in order to enable us more fully to understand the way 
in which Europe was being developed politically. Schulze has embarked on the 
most important and long-overdue objective that any historian of central Europe 
could now possibly undertake. The dispassionate question is "what was going on 
in Germany after the Reformation and before the Thirty Years' War, more widely 
between 1550 and 1620, more specifically between 1559 and 1606?" - to be 
explained from mundane fiscal and chancellery archives, and not, to start with, 
through the more exciting mystical and occult but confusing history of ideas as 
undertaken recently by R. J. Evans in his Rudolf II (Oxford, 1972) or Frances 
Yates in her Rosicrucian Enlightenment (London, 1972). There is a more pressing 
need to document the facts of German bureaucracy and not the flights of German 
fancy in this period. No one has done it, but Schulze now leads the way. 
Alfred Schrocker helps the inquiry enormously by concentrating on a west 
German Catholic ecclesiastical traditionalist, who with Austrian Habsburg support 
once again revised the Old Reich regional federal Circle system in order to 
preserve the politics of the Holy Roman Empire in the century after the first 
great efforts of the 1590s. The Schonboms were Rhineland Franconian Imperial 
knights who remained Catholic, sending their sons into the cathedral chapters 
of the Counter-Reformation Church at Wiirzburg and Mainz. Canon Friedrich 
Georg (d. 1640) was also a successful private banker to many of the courts and 
municipalities that clustered around the Rhine and Main valleys. His cousin, 
Johann Philipp, having first been a canon since the 1620s, inherited and invested 
the family fortune to become elected ruling bishop at Wiirzburg in 1642 and 
Archbishop Elector of Mainz in 1647. As Archchancellor of the Holy Roman 
Empire, from 1647 to 1673, he reconstituted the federal politics of Western 
Germany after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. From his base as leader of the 
Catholic ecclesiastical small states, Johann Philipp steered German federal politics 
between the aspirations of France, the Dutch, Swedes, Brandenburg Prussians, 
Guelphs, Bavarians, and Imperial Austrian Habsburgs with a considerable degree 
of success. In the next generation his nephew, Lothar Franz, worked a way 
through the ecclesiastical hierarchy, via the See of Bamberg, finally to steer 
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federal politics in a pro-Austrian manner as Archbishop of Mainz, from the time 
of the Spanish War of Succession through to 1729. Between 1719 and 1756 four 
nephews followed him as cathedral canons, subsequently becoming in their own 
right ruling bishops at Wiirzburg, Bamberg, Speyer, Constance, Worms and 
archiepiscopal Trier. In three generations, spanning the crucial years 1642-1756, 
this one family of imperial knights produced six ecclesiastical territorial rulers, 
all pluralists holding more than one bishopric at a time. In the era of Louis XIV's 
wars through to the grand volte face of European diplomacy caused by the Silesian 
Wars of Frederick II of Prussia, the Schonborns for more than a century kept 
the ecclesiastical small states of the Rhineland independent, above all increasingly 
by skilful alliance politics under Imperial Austrian Habsburg supervision. They 
based themselves upon regional defence associations, the Reichskreise, which 
pooled the resources of German splinter territories and turned them into a sizeable 
military and fiscal force de frappe using the consultative, imperial practice of 
Circle parliaments and Circle alliances, Kreistage and Kreisassoziationen. 
For those who do not read German, five recent works are available in 
English which put this small-state federalism on the map, thereby superseding 
the traditional interpretation that the Thirty Years' War destroyed the effectiveness 
of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. They are R. A. Wines, "Imperial 
Circles", Journal of Modern History, 39 (1967) ; R. H. Thompson, Lothar Franz 
von Schonborn (The Hague, 1973); G. Benecke, Society and Politics in Germany, 
/500-1750 (London, 1974); J. A. Vann and S. W. Rowan, eds, The Old Reich. 
Essays on German Political Institutions /495-1806 (Brussels, 1974); and J. A. 
Vann, The Swabian Kreis (Brussels, 1975). That the Holy Roman Empire or Old 
Reich survived as a loose confederation of autonomous small states especially 
between 1648 and 1756 was largely due to the organizing skills of one remarkable 
family of Catholic imperial knights -the Schonborns. The first thoroughly concise 
and well written summary of the Schonborn era in Old Reich politics has now 
been produced by Alfred Schrocker. It deserves to be read by everyone wishing 
to make sense of German small states' politics and society as a whole in the Ba-
roque era. Through diplomacy and coercion Lothar Franz von Schonborn master-
minded the regional Circle military system that kept the states of Rhineland Ger-
many independent during and after the Spanish War of Succession. Schrocker 
locates this achievement at the centre of Old Reich federal politics which was 
underwritten by the Austrian Habsburgs of the day, to whom Lothar Franz re-
mained loyal. That is why the Holy Roman Empire survived actively and con-
sciously well into the eighteenth century. But why did it not survive the nineteenth 
century as well? 
III 
The notion that the Enlightenment destroyed the Holy Roman Empire in 
the later eighteenth century is very vague when contrasted with the realities of 
bureaucratic and institutional renewal -Reichskreise, Tiirkensteuer, Reichshofrat, 
Reichskammergericht, Reichsfiskus , and the like - which had Jed to its vigorous 
long-term survival in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Notker Ham-
merstein is aware of this, and that is the strength of his book. Right from the 
start he handles the Enlightenment in terms of educational reform in the Catholic 
territories of the Rhineland, Franconia, East Swabia, Bavaria, and more briefly, 
Austria, where public law and its practical disciplines, ranging from statistics 
to accountancy, replaced theology as the more practically useful training for 
administrators seeking state employment. University reform is examined from the 
standpoint of Catholic territorial state survival via the process of political innova-
tion. 
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Enlightenment and secular public service, rather than religious traditionalism 
and preaching-order-inspired pulpit control, were the new ideals of educational 
politics, which had been missing in Old Reich Germany with its loose, federal 
centre, and for which the territorial state universities had to find a substitute. 
There were after all no Reich universities, but only those of Bavaria, Austria, 
Wiirzburg, Saxony, Lower-Saxony, Cologne, Mainz, and so on. They introduced 
the Enlightenment into Germany at territorial state level, from the Protestant 
north downwards, and it was the princely absolutist form of Enlightenment that 
triumphed. However, republican imperial cities and aristocratic ecclesiastical 
territories also played an albeit diminishing role, which Hammerstein documents 
well for Wiirzburg during the Schonborn era up to the mid-eighteenth century. 
Where the Protestants at Halle and Gottingen may have led the way, the Catholic 
universities eventually also followed. The major question remains as to how the 
ecclesiastical territorial states coped with the problem of secular reform in their 
universities, since only Cologne resisted. Hammerstein covers fourteen Catholic 
institutions of higher education, admittedly by no means all within ecclesiastical 
states, which did reform themselves. Reform meant ultimately ridding oneself of 
Jesuits, rationalizing, secularizing and gaining a modicum of collective responsibil-
ity to treasury accountants, if not to actual collegial democratizing. Why then 
was that not sufficient to allow these states to survive under the mantle of Old 
Reich federalism, which the Schonborns, as outlined by Schrocker, had so 
vividly upheld up to the mid-eighteenth century in the heart of the Empire, in 
ecclesiastical Rhineland-Franconia? The problem remains one of external politics. 
Whereas the threat of French involvement in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries had strengthened German federal and inter-territorial consultative institu-
tions, in the eighteenth century it undermined increasingly those very institutions 
because the threat changed from one that was external, military and despotic 
to one that was internal, egalitarian, populist and potentially dictatorial. There 
was little that fourteen Catholic universities partly representing the "public 
society" of Old Reich Germany could do to hold up such a deluge, especially 
when in the interest of efficient territorial-state mercantilism and cameralism 
native German dynasties encouraged secularization. Perhaps more valuable as a 
factor in keeping the Old Reich alive was the contribution of the mainly Protestant 
publicists like J. J. Moser, his son F. C. von Moser, and through to men like 
J. S. PUtter, whose great, last minute compilations of Old Reich laws and customs 
preserved the old ways of constitutional practice when the system was already 
moribund. This is further documented in the massive, basic work of Franz 
Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (2nd ed., Gottingen, 1967). Ham-
merstein instead prefers to examine something new and narrower: the role of the 
Enlightenment in Catholic higher education where we can see in detail how the 
"sacred spirit" of the Old Reich was undermined. Even before the main revolu-
tionary French onslaught of the late 1790s, little was left of the Old Reich federal, 
traditional and religious loyalty and concord, as seen in the following secular 
territorial-state, educational purpose as expressed in 1791 by Freiburg University to 
its Habsburg territorial rulers and paymasters: 
Quite correctly, one tends to divide the supporters of the Enlightenment into 
academics and common public. The first group leads the second: it shows the 
way. In the lecture hall an idea is hammered out for twenty, thirty and more 
years before the public accepts and adopts it as its own point of view. How 
long did it not take the schools to prepare the way for the reforms under Maria 
Theresia and Joseph II, and how unfortunate were not results in the Southern 
Netherlands precisely because prior preparation via the classroom was not 
undertaken with sufficient care? Hence, how important to the state is not the 
general school and its administrators, for they shape the attitudes of the nation 
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in matters of religion, justice, love of fatherland and ruling prince ... Yet one 
has often been accused of upsetting the order of nature by making Enlighten-
ment the guiding principle of academics, and thereby been thought to have 
been impeding the progress of knowledge. (p. 12) 
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When the podium replaced the pulpit, then truly the territorial state broke free 
from the Old Reich . The 1790s finally saw that break. 
Yet well before Napoleon struck, Catholic German states were no longer 
inculcating loyalty to the Old Reich within their educational systems. Hammer-
stein documents this psychological shift in political emphasis very well, but how is 
one to translate it into an understanding of the political actions and events that 
took place in late eighteenth-century Germany? The history of ideas even in its 
more practical form as the history of state educational institutions can only ever ex-
plain so much, leaving a sensitive gap between the plausible and the convincing in 
the understanding of politics. The fact remains that we still cannot fully explain 
why the Old Reich failed along with its handling of religion and tradition in German 
public life generally between 1770 and 1820, and more specifically from 1799 to 
1806. 
Perhaps secular secret societies did the trick where more palatable anti-
Jesuit, anti-theological and pro-bureaucratic and legal, constitutional, educational 
policies had only led the way? As Klaus Epstein might say, that is an easy ex-
planation acceptable only to Romantic reactionary conservatives. But then party 
politics did begin in a secretive and illegal manner before the Napoleonic era in 
Germany, and it was precisely in enlightened Catholic Bavaria, at lngolstadt and 
at Munich, that the start was made in party politics for Germany as a whole. This 
is the subject of Richard van Diilmen's book. 
The association of Illuminati fanned out from lngolstadt, where it was 
founded in 1776 by Adam Weishaupt, a professor of canon law and a former 
Jesuit. By using reason and moral persuasion it attempted to infiltrate the ranks of 
the territorial states' urban, cultural, educational and civil service elite. Its aim 
was to replace the depraved ideologies of religion and monarchism with the 
freedom and equality of moral, secular man. By 1778 Weishaupt had joined forces 
with Adolf von Knigge, a Freemason who denounced monarchy and aristocracy. 
Proscribed in 1785 by the Munich government, the Illuminati became a secret 
society and spread all over Germany. About two thousand influential people were 
involved in its rituals until the end of the eighteenth century. As a forerunner of 
modem, secular state party politics, it sought to influence higher servants of 
absolutist governments to be moralistic and idealistic, forming them into reading 
and discussion groups, openly for nine years and then clandestinely for another 
fourteen (1776-99). 
Van Diilmen has used official sources, above all, the Bavarian police 
archives, to document the process whereby the Illuminati constituted themselves, 
presenting samples of their oaths, internal loyalties, statutes, instructions, cor-
respondence, reports and decrees. He generously assesses their achievements as 
lying somewhere between reality and Utopia. How could the state provide a 
perfect social and political system for its subjects : an ideal then as now (pp. 133-
40)? The Illuminati were politically naive and ineffective, except in one long-
term sense. They did help to pioneer the forms and methods of what came to be 
the party machine in nineteenth-century German politics. The names of those who 
were most influential in this process are listed with their classical nick-names 
(pp. 439-53). Although van Diilmen is at pains to point out that the Illuminati were 
only an intellectual pressure group he does stress the increasing importance in their 
debates and writings that was laid upon the paradox of exercising violence and 
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power in the name of a great moral rectitude in order to overcome the existing 
ancien regime. At the end of it all, in 1799, the year of Napoleon in Germany, 
Weishaupt wrote that he had never thought to overthrow the state but rather 
wished for nothing other than that which each good and sensible government must 
desire, namely that morality be given a new mission ( der Moral ein neues Interesse) 
to improve the future by means of education, thereby setting to rights all the 
world's abuses. The way to achieve this was by means of a change of heart and 
will, not by evermore cunning technical improvements in government: Sitten und 
Meinungen and not Staatsklugheit were now the order of the day. In this task, 
priests and princes and absolutist constitutions were an encumbrance. But what 
was to be done? Was revolution to overthrow everything and drive out violence 
with violence, tyranny with tyranny? No. Every kind of violent reform was suspect 
in that nothing could be achieved as long as man remained tied to his existing pas-
sions. Wisdom was needed to bring in a rational new age (pp. 138-39). 
Adam Weishaupt had taken the name of "Spartacus" within his movement. 
He lived to be almost as old as Goethe and ended his days as a privy councillor at 
the court in Saxony-Gotha - a Mozartian Jacobin attuned to the form and not the 
substance of Realpolitik as the sacral Old Reich gave way in people's minds to the 
actions of nationalism and industrialization. The formal, rigid institutionalization, 
spying and counter-attack of Illuminati, their character assessments, personal files 
and curricula vitae have remained the tools of modem party politics and state 
service. As an example, the secret report on the quality of Franz Xaver Zwack's 
loyalty to the movement , dated the last day of December 1776, is reproduced after 
page 216 by van Diilmen. It is divided into name, age, place of birth, domicile, 
status, physical appearance, moral character, religion, reliability, education, 
practical skills, hobbies , friends, social contacts, reading and writing interests, 
name for the purposes of secret correspondence, date of joining, how recruited 
and what membership, if any , within other societies, main faults, the date by which 
first exercises were to be submitted (that is, party work tasks) , how wealthy, when 
and what subscription dues were paid; detailed list of what pamphlets already 
provided, any enemies, any patrons? The files of modem institutional life had 
arrived along with the dubious consolation of spurious individualism. 
So now we have at least two ingredients of the answer as to why the Old 
Reich failed in the eighteenth century. Hammerstein documents the sense of 
political inadequacy that is created when tradition is kept going by the mere gim-
micks and technicalities of education and government manipulation of society. 
Van Diilmen shows the reaction which thereafter sets in as the younger intel-
ligentsia lose faith in traditional social change and pioneer their own, too naive, 
rationalist alternatives. The political order is subverted first by enlightened 
paternalists and then by democratic rationalists. The weak federal system of the 
post-1521, post-1555, post-1648 Holy Roman Empire could not hope to survive 
beyond the doubting generation of the 1770s, but did the break with the past have 
to be quite so extreme, so anti-traditional? The worst legacy of 1770-1820 to Ger-
man history was the extremism of those Romantic nationalists who claimed to be 
organic traditionalists and conservatives: they, least of all, understood the Old 
Reich. 
IV 
To summarize, at state one an aristocratic Catholic, traditional ruling elite 
centred on the Rhineland and backed by Vienna ran the Holy Roman Empire before 
and after the Thirty Years' War. They operated the Circle defence system backed 
by Old Reich fiscalism, consultative assemblies and law courts. The imperial 
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knights, the low nobility of the territories and the patricians of the larger towns 
and of the imperial cities especially, operated this federal system. The territorial 
rulers sanctioned it but there was very little institutional flexibility within the Old 
Reich. 
At stage two, in the eighteenth century, this society secularized itself by 
splitting into increasingly sovereign territorial units, each reforming its own laws, 
church and education with little regard for the federal whole. The process created 
cameralists and legal-technological "meritocrats" on the one side and secret 
societies of hopelessly idealistic moralists on the other. The ruling class split into 
traditional and rebellious intellectuals. That led to the end of the spirit of loyalty 
to Old Reich sacral federalism. However, stage one is now being documented from 
the practical political sources much more effectively than stage two. Nevertheless, 
all through the early modern era some very important politicians do emerge: from 
federal treasurer Geizkofler, to imperial archchancellor Schonborn, to educational 
commissioner Ickstatt, privy councillor Weishaupt and city administrator Knigge. 
The question remains: why was social change so difficult to effect in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? The survival of the Old Reich has always 
been a major obstacle to comprehending the transition from feudal to modern times 
in central Europe. Yet we must continue our efforts to link the administrative and 
intellectual history of the politically powerful elites with the wider social groups 
from which they emerged, and which influenced their styles of rule. Then we have 
to modify our understanding of those wider social formations in the light of the 
actual government practices that emerged among the powerful. Here we encounter 
another problem, namely that early modern German social historians, as a re-
latively new breed, have tended to remain overwhelmed by their archival sources, 
tackling usually only very small geographical areas, localities and groups. It is 
high time now to link this piecemeal understanding of local communities, their 
social structures and vital statistics of birth, marriage, death, immigration, profes-
sion, economy, family, health and survival, to the more centralized, constitutional 
and legal frameworks, in which leaders of these communities operated princely 
territories, town councils and the federal whole that was still the Holy Roman 
Empire. 
Three areas of social history at least may now be delineated. Firstly, there 
is the study of the nobility with the problems of ennoblement and the rise of prince-
ly service in the expanding government systems of state under absolutism, mer-
cantilism and cameralism. The history of successful groups within and across their 
own regions, expanding even beyond confessional and ideological barriers because 
of the skills and services they were able to monopolize, has to be merged into the 
political and social system as a whole. Indeed, successful families shared that 
system, and only in cooperation with or reaction to them can the direction of 
social change be understood. We have to link the authors reviewed here to the 
study of families, elites and localities, and that means returning to an examination, 
as social historians, of the events of regional and federal political, constitutional, 
religious, and educational history. A useful recent attempt to do this at a regional 
level is H. Reif, W estfiilischer A del (Gottingen, 1979), which concentrates on 
patterns of education, privilege and influence among the leading social group, 
who were being made increasingly redundant in practical administrative and 
managerial terms across several territorial states and provinces after the later 
eighteenth century. 
Secondly, the very fruitful study of urban communities has given us the 
overall view that already before the Thirty Years' War most German markets and 
business were contracting, or switching their long-distance trade to a more in-
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tensive exploitation of their own localities. In an excellent survey of the local 
archives, Christopher Friedrichs, Urban Society in an Age of War: Nordlingen, 
1580-1720 (Princeton, 1979), shows that a thriving Northern Swabian woollen 
textile industry was hit by warfare, and that the town involved had to concentrate 
more on the local food and drink industry in order to redeploy its manufacturing 
skills and survive. The wars of Louis XIV and of Leopold I, especially the Turk 
Wars and the War of the Spanish Succession from the 1670s until the 1710s, gave 
no respite to the tax-payers in the town. New forms of enterprise appeared by 
undercutting the costs of guild and craft manufacture, by ignoring the narrower 
laws of mercantilism operated by the town council - and getting away with it, 
since the · whole economy generated no successful alternatives. The case of the 
Worner family of Nordlingen in the late seventeenth century is one of German 
capitalism growing out of economic and social adversity. The development came 
precisely. because capital was so scarce that, in order to obtain it, entrepreneurs 
had to rediscipline their work-force in more rigorously unpleasant and socially 
unjust ways. In Nordlingen the immediate result was bad labour relations, strikes 
and riots. The new bosses won these confrontations in the teeth of opposition 
from the town council above them, and from the journeymen and guildsmen 
beneath them in the existing social hierarchy. The long-term result was success 
for the new methods, since the only seeming alternative was continued economic 
stagnation and decline of the whole fabric of Nordlingen town. 
Nordlingen was typical of the majority of small and middling, landlocked 
German urban centres just before and after 1700. They were concerned with 
survival at the local level, and inevitably turned in on themselves. At best their 
leadership went in for piecemeal family status privilege, often purchased from sur-
rounding princely chancelleries, or even from the Imperial chancelleries at Vienna 
and Mainz. That process, called freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit, had been in existence 
for centuries, and it was not to reach its apogee until the late nineteenth century as 
a caricature of success in industrialized Prussia-Germany. A far too brief look at 
some early modern examples of this legitimizing process is in G. Benecke, "En-
noblement and Privilege in Early Modern Germany", History, 56 (1971), and then 
again even more narrowly through the opportunities of non-noble princely service 
in one family, "Absolutism and the Middle Class: The Case of a Northwest German 
Burgher Family in the 17th Century", Histoire sociale -Social History, V (April 
1972). The early modern quietist, careerist, conformist German urban leadership is 
well examined particularly in G. Soliday, A Community in Conflict. Frankfurt 
Society in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries (Hanover, New Hampshire, 1974), as 
well as more generally in Mack Walker's seminal German Home Towns. Com-
munity, State and General Estate, /648-/871 (Ithaca, New York, 1971). 
The case studies of the Imperial cities of Nordlingen and Frankfurt-am-
Main are important to general social history because they show above all that 
where a traditional ruling elite was burgher and middle-class -that is, where it was 
free to act autonomously without internal interference from high clergy, nobles, 
ruling princes and Emperors - it did not spearhead the move towards laissez-faire 
capitalism. Also the llluminati, as enlightened intellectuals, arose in Catholic, 
aristocratic Bavaria, and not in the Protestant Imperial City-Republics like Nord-
lingen and Frankfurt-am-Main. The new business methods were successfully en-
forced in the Ruhr region under absolutist-paternalist Prussian and Palatine princely 
administrations, and not in the ancient, free Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Liibeck 
and Hamburg. 
Thirdly, the development of elite families of nobility, burgher and enterpriser 
has to be explained with reference not only to the legal and educational systems 
under which they trained and employed themselves to develop their own ad-
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vantages into privileges, but also with reference to the wider tax-paying peasant 
and artisan groups in town-market and countryside who actively or passively con-
sented to this development. Social change came as a result of new and illicit eco-
nomic practices. The putting-out industry in textiles, as is well known, destroyed 
guild restrictions of the towns and exploited cheaper labour in the villages and 
farms. The enclosures, woodland, waterway and game laws were operated with 
especial harshness after the mid-seventeenth century by Amtmiinner and Junkers 
under a prerogative ''Justice of the Peace'' and they led to very high levels of ende-
mic violence in the countryside. For the Alpine Austrian lands, this is well brought 
out in all its folk-heroic hopelessness by G. Griill, Bauer, Herr und Landesfiirst 
(Graz, 1963). But resolution of conflict came in traditional feudal manner as com-
promise between ruler and ruled through the absolutist, expert territorial state and 
federal, Old Reich courts. Immediate success was achieved at the expense of longer 
term social change: privileges defended for too long led to an antiquated class 
structure plus an inability to reform by clinging to that which was traditionally 
cohesive and useful in the politics of the Old Reich. It was the price paid by the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries for the failure to find successful alterna-
tives to Nordlingers like Daniel Womer and his new industrial capitalism "through 
cheating in adversity" , prevalent in the German towns around the 1690s. So equal-
ly , there was no respite from paying the social price within the political system of 
the enforced game laws, enclosure and land-use restrictions under the new manage-
rial agrarian capitalism of improving landlords like W. H. von Hohberg, as brilliant-
ly described by Otto Brunner in his Adeliges Land/eben und europiiischer Geist 
(Salzburg, 1949). It also operated through the eyes of the local authorities hunting 
the villainous underdog in the farms around Linz on the Danube in the 1660s, as 
portrayed from the archives, among other things, by G. Griill, cited above. 
The way in which these new men and methods - capitalistic labour use and 
manufacture in town and country - found practical cover or clandestine accep-
tance in the loose, federal system of the aristocratic, religious and feudal Holy 
Roman Empire can only be understood by asking social and economic historians 
to read the constitutional and cultural studies of the new school of early modem 
German history as exemplified by the work of Professors Schulze, Schrocker, 
Hammerstein and van Diilmen. 
* * * 
Gerhard BENECKE, 
University of Kent. 
PIERRE DocKES. -La liberation medievale. Paris , Flammarion, 1979. 317 p. 
Voila un livre au titre fort prometteur publie par un professeur d'economie 
politique de l'Universite de Lyon. Bien que n'etant pas historien, M. Dockes 
s'est interesse a l'histoire economique par le biais surtout des theories economi-
ques qui virent le jour aux XVI•, XVII• et XVIII• siecles. Cette fois-ci, il s'attaque 
a Ia question fort importante du passage de l'esclavagisme au feodalisme. Ille fait 
en tentant de renverser non seulement les interpretations traditionnelles mais aussi 
certaines interpretations marxistes. En bref, pour lui, Ia societe feodale serait nee 
de }'opposition maitres-esclaves, Ia lutte des uns contre les autres ayant ete «por-
teuse d'une societe nouvelle pensee comme retour vers une communaute ... et l'ob-
